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sidy will be optimal if demand is very convex, as with constant elasticity
demand. If ad valorem tariffs or subsidies are considered, a subsidy is
optimal if the elasticity of demand increases as consumption increases.
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1.Introduction
In recent years considerable attention has been focused on the use of
export cartels to extract rents from international markets. Indeed, the
formation of the OPEC oil cartel is probably the single economic event of
greatest notoriety to have occurred in the past dozen years. In addition,
national governments, particularly in developed countries, haveengaged
in a variety of policies designed to enhance the marketpower of
domestically based export industries, including encouragement of "cooper—
ation" between domestic firms, and provision of protected home markets.'
The general point is that the international marketplace provides strong
incentives for unilateral policies aimed at promoting the interests of
domestic firms, leading to intervention in industries which might otherwise
be quite competitive.
Relatively little attention has been paid to the optimal response by
consuming nations to foreign imperfect competition, and in particular, to
foreign cartelization.2 In this paper our first objective is to examine
the optimal tariff response. If foreign firms earn rents from sales in the
domestic country, some of these rents can be extracted by using a tariff.3
Imports will fall and so will consumer welfare but this can usually be more
than offset by increased tariff revenue. Surprisingly, however, the effic—
lent response to foreign cartelizatiori is, in some cases, to subsidize
imports.—2—
The conditions underlyingwhether a tariff or a subsidyis optimal
vary depending Ott
whether it is ad valorein or specifictariffs that are
under consideration. With aspecific tariff or subsidy,whether a subsidy
is optimal depends on the
convexity of demand. In thead valorem case,
the critical condition concerns
whether the elasticity ofdemand rises or
falls along the demand curve.In both cases the conditionfor choosing be-
tween a tariff or subsidyapplies to foreign monopolyand, more generally,
to any foreign noncooperativeCournot oligopoly, regardless
of the number
of firms in the industry.
A second objective of the paper is todraw attention to the incentive
structure of international trade negotiations.A noncooperative equili-
brium arising from independent pursuitof national objectives will be char-
acterized by inefficiently high levelsof policy intervention. Multilateral
negotiations such as those carried outunder CATT can be viewed as attempts
to move toward the (collectivelysuperior) joint maximizingsolution.
However, in the absence of anyclearly specified enforcementmechanism
that would make the liberalizedjojnt_maxifl1izing solutionindividually
rational, the results of such negotiationshave to be regarded as fragile
outcomes that are likely to require
constant attention if they areto be
ma in La med
Section 2 of the paper sets out thebasic framework and characterizes
the optimum specific tariff in
the presence of foreign imperfect comp
etitionSection 3 examines the optimumtariff for the particular cases
of foreign monopoly and perfectcompetitionThe optimal ad valorem
tariff is considered in Section 4.Section 5 offers an interpretationof
our results using "termsof trade" arguments associatedwith the standard
monopoly tariff problemSection 6 considers the optimaltariff for n—firm—3—
Cournot oligopoly, and section 7 examines the interaction between the
degree of foreign imperfect competition and the optimum tariffSection
8 contains concluding remarks.
2.The Optimum Specific Tariff for Extracting Rent from Foreign Firms
Taking the view that the industry in question is small compared to
the entire economy so that partial equilibrium analysis is appropriate,
we assume that domestic demand arises from a utility function that
can be approximated by the form
U =u(X)+ m (1)
where X is consumption of the good under consideration and m is
expenditure on other goods. Use of this approximation for both positive
and normative analysis assumes away a number of theoretical difficulties,
including income effects, aggregation problems, and second—best problems
induced by other distortions in the economy. These problems are
complicated biit reasonably well understood and trying to deal with
them here would obscure the basic focus of the paper, which is the exis-
tence of a pure rent—seeking incentive for tariffs.
Inverse demand is just the derivative of u:
p =u'(X);p' <0 (2)
where p represents price. Consumer surplus u(X) —pXis, in this case,
a consistent measure of the benefit to domestic consumers from consuming
good X. Therefore, with specific tariff t, the net domestic gain, C,
from imports of good X is
G(t) =u(X)—pX+ tX (3)—4—
The net benefit consists of two parts; consumer surplus and tariff
revenue. One dollar of tariff revenue counts the same as one dollar
of consumer surplus. The sales level X will depend on the tariff,
and the optimal specific tariff is found by setting Ct =dC/dt 0




where Ptp'X. Letting p E'-tX/X,the elasticity of imports with
respect to the tariff, we can rewrite expression (4) as
i — = (5)
Condition (5) characterizes the optimum tariff rule for extracting rent
from foreign firms, provided second order condition Gtt<O is satisfied.
The elasticity of imports with respect to the tariff and the
effect of the tariff on consumer price, must sum to one. The term Pt
reflects the decline in consumer surplus as the tariff is increased.
If the country's objective were simply to maximize tariff revenue with-
out considering the loss of consumer surplus the solution would require
p =1.In our setting p must be less than one at the solution since
is generally positive.




where t* is the optimum tariff. Furthermore, denoting the producer—5—
price, p—t, by q, and observing that =
Pt
—1,(6) can be rewritten as
=
Xq/X (6')
X is negative.From (6), a positive t*isobtained if
<1.Equivalently, from (6'), t> 0if the effect of increasing
the tariff is to reduce the producer price. If, on the otherhand,
>0,the optimal tariff is negative: imports should be subsidized,
for, in this case, consumer price falls by more than the subsidy.In
the next section we show, perhaps surprisingly, that subsidization arises
for some relatively standard demand and cost structures.
3. The Specific Tariff: Monopoly and Perfect Competition
We first consider the case of a foreignmonopoly cartel. Presumably
the cartel supplies several markets ofwhich the domestic country is only
one. It is assumed that the monopoly cartel isable to discriminate among
markets and maximize profit in eachcountry separately.(Any constraints
imposed by arbitrage possibilities are notbinding over the relevant range.)
Choices in different markets might beconnected through the dependence of
marginal cost on total output. This complicationcan be eliminated by
assuming that marginal cost is constant in therange of output under consid-
eration.
An alternative setting is that theforeign monopolist sells only
in the domestic market, in whichcase nonconstant marginal cost can
be handled very easily. In thecase of a specific tariff, the variable
profit in the domestic market for the monopolist is
ir(X)= Xp(X)—c(X)—tX
(7)—6—
Letting c' denote marginal cost, the first order condition is
=p+p'X—c'—t=0 (8)
with second order condition
=2p'+Xp''—c''
=p'(2+R)—C'' < 0 (9)
where R Xp''/p'. (10)
The variable R is a measure of the relative curvature of the
demand curve. It can also be interpreted
as the elasticity of p'. A restriction on the value of R
important regularity condition when dealing with general
particularly in the case of imperfect competition.4 The
curve p(X) is concave to the origin, linear or convex as
zero, or negative, respectively. Larger absolute values
with greater relative curvature
In order to obtain pt(E p'X, we first obtain X, the effect of
a tariff (or subsidy) on the supply of imports,by totally differentiating




X is negative by the second order condition: an increase inthe tariff







of R are associated—7—
Also, using (11) and (12) we can write (6) as t—p'X(l+R—c''/p'). If
marginal cost is constant, then Pt is less than, equals, or exceeds 1, and
the optimal tariff is positive, zero, or negative according to whether
R >—1,R =—lor R <—lrespectively.
If R >—1,so that demand is not "too" convex to the origin and
if marginal cost is constant or increasing, then from (12),
Pt
<1and
the optimum tariff t is positive. Since R =Xp"/p',all concave or
linear demand curves satisfy R ￿ 0 and therefore R >—1.(The linear
case, for which R =0,was considered by Katrak (1977) and Svedberg (1979).)
The possibility that imports from the foreign monopolist should
be subsidized arises if Pt >1.From expression (12), Pt may exceed 1
for two reasons. The first possibility is that marginal cost is decreasing
sufficiently fast that c''/p' >(l + R)(but c''/p' <(2 + R))to satisfy
the firm's second order condition). The second possibility is that
demand is sufficiently convex In particular if c'' =0,then R must
be less than —1 for subsidization to be welfare—maximizing.
Thislatter possibility is illustrated by a demand curve with
constant elasticity in the relevant range.Differentiating inverse
demandp =aX1with respect to X whereis the (positive) constant
elasticitywe obtain R —1 —(1/fl).Ti must exceed 1 to satisfy the
first order condition for a monopolist, so R must be between —2 and
—1, which is consistent with the monopolist's second order condition
(9) if c' 'isnot too negative. From (12) c' '>0is sufficient to
5
ensure that Pt exceeds 1 and (6) implies that a subsidy is called for.
This can be understood by noting that R <—1is equivalent to
demand being steeper than marginal revenue. The slope of demand is—8—
p' and the slope of marginal revenue (mr) is Xp'' + 2p'. Then mr' —p'=
Xp''+ p' =p'(R+ 1). Thus R <—lif and only if mr' —p'is positive.
With constant marginal cost, a subsidy, s, then causes price to fall
by more than the subsidy. This is illustrated in Figure 1.As a
subsidy s is introduced price charged moves from p0 to p1 and quantity
from X0 to X1. The cost of the subsidy is shown by the vertically
shaded region which, as drawn, clearly has less area than the
diagonally shaded region, which represents the gain in consumers'
surplus.
—Figure1 —
Thesubsidy increases the welfare of both the domestic country
and the foreign firm and cannot therefore be regarded as a "rent—
extracting" policy. This curious result arises because the subsidy
causes price to fall sufficiently that the additional consumer
surplus more than compensates for the cost of the subsidy.
Suppose now that the foreign industry is perfectly competitive.
If the long run industry supply curve is horizontal (although individual
firms may have U—shaped average cost curves), then Pt =1:a tariff
causes an equal increase in the domestic price. In this case
expression (6) implies that t =0and the optimum policy is free
trade.
If a foreign perfectly competitive industry has an upward
sloping supply curve of exports to the domestic country, then Pt <1
and, by expression (6), the country gains by using a tariff. Hence,—9—
in the special case of perfect competition, our tariff rule is
essentially a partial equilibrium version of the "monopoly tariff"
or "terms of trade" argument for using a tariff. Figure 2 illustrates
the extraction of rent from a competitive foreign industry with
upward sloping supply. The curve denoted ME (for marginal expenditure)
is marginal to supply curve S and the optimum occurs where ME equals
marginal benefit (price) with tariff t as shown.
—Figure2 —
4.The Optimum ad Valorem Tariff
Consider now an ad valorem tariff or subsidy.It is still the case
that either a tariff or subsidy may be optimal, depending on demand and
cost. Interestingly, however, the conditions on demand that lead to a
subsidy are rather different than in the case of a specific tariff or sub-
sidy: an ad valorem tariff affects the first order condition of the for-
eign monopolist in a structurally different way than does a specific
tariff and therefore, for given demand and cost conditions, gives rise
to different price effects.
We denote the ad valorem tariff by v, so the relationship between
consumer price p and producer price q is given by
p(v) =q(v)(l+v) (13)
Tariff revenue is qvX, and we use T(v) to represent the tariff per
unit of imports associated with ad valorem tariff v. Therefore T =vq— 10—
andtotal tariff revenue can be written TX Net domestic benefit C, is
consumer benefit plus tariff revenue.
G(v) =u(X(v))—pX+TX (14)
Expression (14) is equivalent to expression (5), except that here it is
the ad valorem v, rather than the specific tariff t that is the choice







which corresponds to (4) for the specific tariff. Rearranging (15) to
solve for the optimum level of T yields
T* X(p —T)/x (16) Vv V
Sincepq(1+v) and Tvq it follows that p =q+Tand therefore that
q =p—T




Aswith the specific tariff case, it is the sign of the comparative
static effect of the tariff on producer price that determines whether a
tariff or subsidy is optimal. X is negative (as is easily shown),
consequently expression (l6')implies that the optimum tariff per unit of
imports and corresponding ad valorem tariff itself are positive if is
negative. A subsidy is optimal if q, the effect of the ad valorem
tariff on producer price, is positive.
Because an ad valorem tariff affects a foreign cartel's behaviour
differently than does a specific tariff, the conditions for <0
differ from the conditions for <0.To determine the sign of q
consider the profit—maximizing problem of the foreign cartel:
max TI =pX/(1+ v) —c(X)
(17)— 11—
Fromthe first order condition 0we obtain
q(v) E p(v)/(1+v) =ric'(X)/(fl—l) (18)
where r is the (positive) elasticity of demand: n= —plXpt(X)Also,
using the second order condition Tr < 0, it can be seen that
dX/dvX < 0.Then, if marginal cost is constant, taking the derivative
of (18) yields
dq/dvq =—c'(X)xX/(fl—l)2
where ri=dfl/dX,Since X < 0 and c'(X) > 0 it follows that the sign
of q depends on whether rises or falls along the demand curve.6
> 0 if > 0 (subsidy) (19a)
0 if =0 (constant elasticity r>non_intervention) (19b)
< 0 if < 0 (tariff) (l9c)
The ad valorem regime is less likely than the specific regime to
give rise to a welfare—improving subsidy. With constant marginal cost,
constant elasticity demand implies an optimal subsidy for the specific
regime but implies the optimality of non—intervention in the ad valorem
case. It can be shown that the condition R < —1, which is sufficient
for a subsidy in the specific case, is necessary but not sufficient for a
subsidy in the ad valorem case.7 If marginal cost is increasing rather
than constant the subsidy of course becomes less likely in both regimes
5.Tariffs and the Terms of Trade
The relationship between our approach with imperfect competition
and the standard monopoly tariff analysis should be clarified. (The
monopoly tariff argument is associated with Johnson (1953),
among others.) The monopoly (or optimum) tariff is used when the— 12—
foreignindustry is perfectly competitive and the domestic country is
large enough to have influence on world prices. In this paper foreign
firms or cartels are imperfectly competitive and may price discriminate
among markets. (OPEC is not the best example of price discrimination
although even here most major producers charge different prices at home
than they do in "world" markets) With price discrimination even a
country that is far too small to affect world prices can influence the
profit—maximizing output and price chosen by foreign producers for the
domestic market. From a purely domestic point of view industry specific
tariffs are then attractive tools to extract rent.
Even without price discrimination imperfectly competitive firms
change the analysis. Just as a monopoly has no supply curve, the
foreign country has no offer curve. Imagine that the industry des-
cribed here is embedded in a simple general equilibrium model. There
is one other good, denoted m, which is produced competitively and
whose price is normalized to equal 1. Domestic preferences are still
represented by expression (1), and the domestic country produces only
good m. Imports of good X are paid for with exports of good in so as
to maintain balanced trade.
In the pre—tariff state, the domestic country consumes at A and
produces at B in Figure 3. The balanced trade line joining B and A
has slope —p. Note, however, that this terms of trade line is not a
comsumption possibility frontier. Because the foreign cartel chooses
both price and quantity given perceived demand, the consumption
possibilities set (with trade) is a single point. A tariff or subsidy- 13-
shiftsthe position of this point and makes consumer price differ
from the slope of the balanced trade line.
The effect of a welfare—improving tariff is to shift out the
equilibrium balanced trade line as illustrated in Figure 3, leading
to consumption at point A' and higher domestic welfare
—Figure3 —
Ineither the ad valorem or specific regimes, if a tariff is optimal
the consumer price rises by less than the tariff revenue per unit of
imports (see (6) and (16)), so that the producer price must fall, improving
the country's terms of trade The subsidy case is rather interesting.
For a subsidy to be optimal we require that the subsidy must cause the
consumer price to fall by more than the subsidy, improving the country's
terms of trade net of the subsidy8 With an optimal subsidy, the post—
subsidy producer relative price is less than the pre—subsidy price.
Once again the equilibrium balanced trade line shifts out. Indeed,
deciding whether a tariff or subsidy would be better amounts to finding
which would shift out the equilibrium balanced trade line.9
In the tariff case, the foreign country loses more than the dom-
estic country gains. In the subsidy case, both gain. Without any
changes in production, the impact effect of the subsidy is to improve
the foreign country's terms of trade. Profit maximizing behaviour by
the foreign cartel then leads it to increase production and to reduce
the producer price by more than the subsidy, which worsens the foreign
terms of trade compared to the pre—subsidy state. Despite the worsened
terms of trade the foreign country gains through a production effect as— 14-
worldconsumption of X rises toward the efficient level,
6. Extracting Rent from a Cournot Oligopoly
Pure monopoly and perfect competition are of some interest but
are not, perhaps, the empirically relevant cases. We examine
the optimum rent—extracting tariff for what is perhaps the best—under-
stood and most frequently employed oligopoly model: the Cournot model.
The setting involves a foreign oligopoly which considers the
domestic country as a well—defined distinct market. There arerl identical
firms, and each firm has variable profit ii, export level x, and constant
marginal cost c'. Then, for the specific tariff case, iixp(x) —c'x—tx,
where X =nx,with associated first order condition xp' + p —c'—t=0.
Taking (6'), multiplying numerator and denominator by p', noting that
Ptp'X, and using the first order condition yields
=n(p—c'_t*)q/p (20)
This expression indicates that a non—zero t depends on the distortion
p > c': if p =c',t=0is the solution to (20)Also the optimal
specific tariff is higher the greater its incidence, to foreign
producers relative to itsincidence,p, to domestic consumers, After
solving for the comparative static effects1° Xn/p'(n + 1 + R) and
Pt =n/(n+ 1 + R) we obtain, from (6),
t —p'X(l + R)/n (21)— 15—
Asbefore, whether t is positive or negative depends on R: the relative
curvature of demand. The critical condition for a subsidy,R <—1,is
independent of the number of firms and therefore holds for both monopoly
and Cournot oligopoly. However, the magnitude of t diminishes, for
any given R, as n rises.(In general, of course, R may vary along the
demand curve, but the generaltendency of increases in n to decrease
t* is clear.)
In the case of an ad valorem tariff v, the argument of Section 4 is
easily extended to the oligopoly case. A subsidy will, as before, be
welfare—improving if dq/dv < 0It is easily shown that the condition
corresponding to (18) is
q(v) =nflct/(nfl—1) (22)
from which it follows, once again, that whether or not a subsidy is
optimal depends on whether n rises or falls along the demand curve.
Therefore, for the ad valoreni case as well as for the specific tariff/sub-
sidy case, the conditions under which a subsidy or tariff is welfare—
improving are unchanged by the addition of more firms.
7. Noncooperative Equilibrium
The strategy variable of the exporting country is the extent of
cartelization and the strategy variable of the importing country is the
tariff or subsidy level. A noncooperative equilibrium arises when, given
the level of the strategy variable chosen by the other country, each country
is maximizing with respect to Its own strategy variable. We can think
of the extent of cartelization as being measured by the number of independ-
ent noncooperative decision—making units in the export industry, which we
referto as the number of "firms".— 16—
Ifthe objective of the foreign government is to maximize welfare
as measured by conventional surplus measures, and if sales of the
imperfectly competitive good in the foreign country are negligible
when compared with exports, then the interests of the government
coincide with those of the i-ndustry.In this case the "best—
response" or "reaction" to any tariff or subsidy is full cartelization
of the industry. The reaction function, defining the optimal number
of firms, n, as a function of the tariff level, t, is a vertical line
at n =1in n,t space(In this section we restrict attention to the
specific tariff, so as to save space. Similar analysis can be carried
out for the ad valorem case.)
The reaction function of the consumingcountry t*(n), showing
the optimal tariff as a function of the degree of foreign cartelization,
is normally downward sloping. (This is certainly true for the specific
tariff with linear demand and constant marginal cost.11 )Thereaction
function is drawn sloping downward in Figure 4, and, as shown, the equili-
brium (point A) consists of a monopoly cartel and the best—responsespec-
ific tariff calculated in Section 3.
-Figure4 —
Thereare two points to be made about this noncooperative equilibrium.
First, it is clearly inefficient. The "first—best" outcome involves price
equal to marginal cost and a zero tariff. However, despite this ineffic-
iency the noncooperative equilibrium is better for the exporting country
than the first—best outcome, in which all surplus accrues to the consuming— 17—
nation.This is a simple but important point. Trade liberalization in a
particular industry is not likely to improve the welfare of all countries
involved. For trade liberalization to be successful one should expect to
see agreements in which each country makes concessions in some industries in
return for advantages in others.
If the exporting nation also consumes the product at home, the
national case for cartelization is not so clear since cartelization
reduces the welfare of domestic consumers. Auquier and Caves (1979)
consider this tradeoff between gains from exports to foreign markets
and domestic losses due to cartelization using the price cost margin as
the measure of cartelization.
Here, howeverwe think of the number of firms as the choicevari-
able, and the point can be made rather easily. Assuming, for easeof
illustration, constant marginal cost, the objective function of the
exporting country is
G* =(p—t)X(t)+ U*(X*) —c(X+ X*) (23)
where asterisks denote variables associated with the exporting country.
Maximizing with respect to n yields
dG*/dn C =(p+Xp'—c—t)dX/dn+ (p* —c)(dX*/dn) 0 (24)
n
where we assume that the cartel may charge different prices in its home
and foreign markets (p and p* may differ). Under noncooperative (Cournot)
oligopoly the first order condition of each firm in its exportmarket is
p + xp' —c—t=0,and adding (n—l)xp' to lioth sides ofthisyields
p + Xp —c—t=(n—l)xp' (25)— 18—
Substituting(25) into (24)andusing X and X to denote dX/dn and
dX*/dn respectively, we have
n =_(X*/X)(p*_c)/xpt+ 1 (26)
Expression (24) is not a reduced form, but it is sufficient to allow a
clear understanding of the economics involved. If there is no home
consumption, X* andX are zero, so the optimal response is n1. If
there are no export sales x and X are zero and the optimum is for n
to become arbitrarily large, to achieve the domestic competitive out-
come. In the intermediate range n exceeds 1, with n being greater as
responses in the home market are relatively more important.
*
Inthis case, since x,p,p and Xn all depend on the tariff set
by the importing country, the optimum n is no longer independent of
the tariffIt is possible, for particular demand structures, that the
reaction function in (n,t) space might be downward—sloping. However,
the reaction function would generally tend to be upward sloping because
the export market becomes relatively less important as the tariff rises.
A noncooperative equilibrium such as point B illustrated in Figure 4
would emerge— 19—
8.Concluding Remarks
National gvernments can be expected to perceive incentives to
intervene in international markets that are potentially imperfectly com-
petitive. Just as there is a wide variety of technological and behav-
ioural structures in various industries, there is also a wide variety
of policy intervention tools available. In this paper we have focused
on two fairly straightforward tools: cartelization of domestic export
industries and rent—extracting tariffs in the face of imperfectly compet-
itive imports.
Both specific tariffs and ad valorem tariffs are considered in the
paperIn both cases we find, surprisingly, that either a tariff or a
subsidy may be the optimal response, depending on the nature of demand
and cost,In the specific tariff regime the relevant variable is the relative
curvature of demand, Xp"/p', which we denoted by R. With constant marginal
cost a tariff or subsidy is optimal depending on whether R exceeds or
falls short of minus one, respective1y A specific subsidy would, for
example, be implied by constant elasticity demand.In the ad valorem case
it is the change in the elasticity of demand along the demand curve that
is the critical indicator,IF the elasticity of demand decreases as one
moves down the curve (as with linear demand) a tariff is welfare—improving;
if the elasticity increases a subsidy is welfare—improving.
The change in the elasticity is not unrelated to R and, in particular,
for an ad valorem subsidy to be optimal R must certainly be less than
minus one in the constant marginal cost case, Thus a subsidy is less— 20—
likelyto be welfare—improving in the ad valorem than in the specific
regime.In both regimes the subsidy case requires strongly convex
demand and would have to be considered unusual. Also, in both regimes the
critical condition for a tariff or subsidy to be welfare—improving holds
generally for a foreign cartel or for foreign Cournot oligopoly,
irrespective of the number of firms,
In the case of the subsidy we have shown that both countries gain, but
normally distortionary interventionist policies tend to be of the "beggar—
thy—neighbour" sort. One country's gain is another country's loss, and
there is usually an additional deadweight loss in the bargain. Neverthe-
less, a noncooperative international trade equilibrium will involve inter-
vention of this sort. In the simple case of a potential export cartel
(without home consumption) the equilibrium involves a monopoly cartel and
the corresponding optimal tariff.
This paper provides support for the multilateral approach to
trade liberalization. The result of unilateral pursuit of domestic
objectives would not be a desirable outcome. Trade liberalization is
not a matter of countries getting together and agreeing to "do the
sensible thing". On the contrary, we might expect that in return for
some kind of liberalization in its own policies, each country would
require compensation in form of liberalization in other country's
policies. Unfortunately, efficient liberalized policies do not con-
stitute a natural noncooperative equilibrium, and are likely to
require regular reinforcement if they are to survive.— 21—
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1. The idea of using domestic policy to promote the potentialmonopoly
power of domestic firms has beenconsidered by Basevi (1969).
Frenkel (1971), and Auquier and Caves (1979). Krugman(1983) has
an interesting analysis of tlw effectsof protected home markets.
2. The idea that imperfect competition might, from the point of view of
one country, call for policy intervention has of course been recog-
nized in the rldistortionst literature (see, in particular, Bhagwati
(1971)). Corden (1974) points out some second best policy incentives
that might arise under imperfect competition.
3. The idea that rent can be extracted from a foreign monopoly is pre-
sented by Katrak (1977) and Svedburg (1979), who construct linear
examples, and is an implicit theme in the state—trading—literature.
(See, for example, Just, Schmitz and Silberman (1979) and Stegemann
(1981).) Brander and Spencer (1981) examine the use of a tariff to
extract rent from an entry—deterring foreign monopolist and Bergstrom
(1982) considers the noncooperative tariff response to OPEC by consum-
ing nations.
4. R may look familiar because it has the same algebraic form as the
formula for relative risk aversion (with X as wealth and p as utility).
5. The possibility of a subsidy is consistent with second order
condition G< 0, for the importing country0 For example, with
constant marginal cost and constant elasticity demand,
=X((l
+ R) P+ 1), which is negative if R< —1.
6.We are indebted to the referee for suggesting considerationof the
ad valorem case, deriving expression (18), and obtaining theresult
relating q to changes in the elasticity of demand along thedemand
curve. The method of derivation we have useddiffers from that
offered by the referee, who based his analysis on marginal changesfrom
the zero tariff point rather than on local conditions nearthe
optimum.In both cases one needs to rely on overall concavityof C
in the choice variable for the arguments to be complete.— 22—
7.The condition <0is necessary and sufficient for an ad valorem
subsidy to be welfare improving. Since n= —p/p'X,
fl= -((p')2X—
p(p'+Xp"))/(p'X)2from which it follows that fl has the same sign as
p'X—p(l+R)where R =Xp"/p'.Since p' <0,clearly R <—lis
necessary but not sufficient for fl >0
8. The condition p >Iis of course only a marginal condition.
Along the path tfrom nonintervention to the optimal subsidy,
Pt might conceivably be smaller than one in some ranges, since
p is endogenous and varies along the demand curve. It is
fir1y clear that an optimal subsidy must discretely lower price.
For many common demand structures, including linear and constant
elasticity demand (and provided marginal cost is constant) marginal
and discrete effects have the same sign.
9 We should mention here the possibility of multiple local optima.
It is possible that first order condition (6) might have several
solutions, and that one solution might imply a tariff while
another implied subsidization. Global concavity of C in t will
of course rule out multiple solutions, and in the familiar examples
of linear and constant elasticity demand, with constant marginal
cost, the solution is unique. In any case, the overall optimum is
well—defined. The interesting point is that there may be both a
tariff and a subsidy that would shift out the equilibrium balanced
trade line.
10. The comparative static effects and Pt are calculated in the same
manner as for the monopoly case. The one point to note is that
=—( 1at)1a wherea =p+ n(p' + xp") =p'(n+ 1 + R), and
a <0for local stability. (See Seade 1980, p. 483.)a takes the
place of the second order condition because actual equilibrium
changes in X differ from the beliefs held by firms. Then, since
—l and X nx the comparative static effects in the
text follow.
11With linear demand R =0,so from (21) t=—p'xif marginal cost
is constant. Then dt/dn Ep'(x +xt*)or,collecting n ntn
terms in t,t* =_p'x/(l+p'x),which is negative since x <0
in this case— 23—
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